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CHIPPING AWAY AT PROPOSITION 115
Joan Comparet-Cassani*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1990 Proposition 115 amended section 872(b) of the
California Penal Code.' As amended, the statute provides a new
exception to the hearsay rule: At a preliminary hearing "the find-
ing of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon the
sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer relating the state-
ments of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the
matter asserted.,
2
Recently, Division Five of the First District Court of Appeal
in Nienhouse v. Superior Cour? held that the term "declarant" as
used in section 872(b) includes a defendant.4 In a unanimous de-
cision the court held that the defense may introduce into evidence
a defendant's exculpatory out-of-court statements from a law en-
forcement officer, either on cross-examination or as its own wit-
ness on direct examination, if the requirements of section 866' are
* Judge, Long Beach Municipal Court.
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West Supp. 1996). This statutory provision
was enabled by the addition of Section 30(b) to Article I of the California Constitu-
tion, which expressly permits the admission of hearsay at preliminary hearings: "In
order to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases, hearsay evidence shall be
admissible at preliminary hearings, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the People
through the initiative process." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30, cl. b.
2. California Penal Code section 872(b) provides:
Notwithstanding Section 1200 of the Evidence Code, the finding of prob-
able cause may be based in whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a
law enforcement officer relating the statements of declarants made out of
court offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Any law enforcement of-
ficer testifying as to hearsay statements shall either have five years of law
enforcement experience or have completed a training course certified by
the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training which includes
training in the investigation and reporting of cases and testifying at prelimi-
nary hearings.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b).
3. 42 Cal. App. 4th 83,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (1996).
4. See id. at 91-92,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578.
5. Penal Code section 866(a) directs the magistrate to require an offer of proof
from the defense when the People so request:
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met.
6
As will be shown, the court's conclusion conflicts with the in-
tent and goals of Proposition 115 by expanding the rights of defen-
dants, conflicting with the law on the admissibility of a defendant's
hearsay statements, violating the rules of statutory construction,
and rendering a holding that creates problems unaddressed and
unresolved by the court.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Nienhouse court correctly begins its analysis with the
cardinal rule of statutory construction, which is "to ascertain the
intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the
law.",7 But just as quickly, indeed in the very next paragraph, the
court abandons that endeavor and concludes that the term
"declarant" as used in this section includes a defendant because
there is no restrictive language in the statute precluding this inter-
pretation.8
This analysis is simply incorrect. "When used in a statute,
words must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature
and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear."9 Thus, a
statute must be interpreted in light of the legislative purpose and
design '° and should not be interpreted to frustrate that intent."
When the examination of witnesses on the part of the people is closed,
any *** witness the defendant may produce shall be sworn and exam-
ined.
Upon the request of the prosecuting attorney, the magistrate shall re-
quire an offer of proof from the defense as to the testimony expected from
the witness. The magistrate shall not permit the testimony of any defense
witness unless the offer ofproof discloses to the satisfaction of the magis-
trate, in his or her sound discretion, that the testimony of that witness, if
believed, would be reasonably likely to establish an affirmative defense,
negate an element of a crime charged, or impeach the testimony of a prose-
cution witness or the statement of a declarant testified to by a prosecution
witness.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 866(a).
6. See Nienhouse, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 91-92,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578.
7. Id. at 89, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576; see also In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889,
694 P.2d 744,754, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 641 (1985) (holding that the intent of the enact-
ing body is the paramount consideration in construing constitutional and statutory
provisions, whether enacted by the legislature or by initiative).
8. See Nienhouse, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 89-90,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577.
9. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 124, 763 P.2d 852, 858, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 7-8 (1988).
10. See People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1007, 741 P.2d 154, 156, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 656, 658 (1987).
11. See People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 273, 497 P.2d 481, 499, 102 Cal. Rptr.
137, 155 (1972).
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"Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical
circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining
the legislative intent.,
12
Unlike most legislation, the initiative clearly sets forth the
goals of the People in enacting Proposition 115.13 The objectives
include "comprehensive reforms [in the] criminal justice system,"'
14
a determination "to restore balance to our criminal justice system,
[and] to create a system in which justice is swift and fair, and.., in
which crime victims and witnesses are treated with care and re-
spect.
, 15
Frustration with crime in the streets, schools, homes, and
neighborhoods, and the perception that court decisions have fa-
vored and expanded the rights of defendants at the expense of vic-
tims' rights, are the historical factors that motivated the propo-
nents of Proposition 115.16
The official voter's pamphlet containing Proposition 115 in-
cluded a summary of the initiative, the legislative analyst's analy-
sis, the arguments in favor and against the initiative, and the re-
spective rebuttal arguments.17  Ballot arguments in favor of
Proposition 115 reflected frustration and dissatisfaction with the
state of the law and the treatment afforded victims and witnesses
of crime.'8 For example, Proposition 115 proponents argued that
"[f]or years, politicians in Sacramento have refused to enact
tougher laws, like those in other states."'9 The pamphlet also in-
cluded the claim that "defense lawyers love delays. Witnesses die
or their memories fade. Busy people avoid drawn-out jury service.
Prolonged trials go haywire. With judges and prosecutors frus-
12. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1387,
743 P.2d 1323,1327,241 Cal. Rptr. 67,70 (1987).
13. See 1990 Cal. Stat. A-243, § 1.
14. Id. § 1(a).
15. Id § 1(c).
16. See id § 1(a), (c); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 348, 801 P.2d 1077,
1084, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 333 (1990) (stating that the purpose of Proposition 115 was
to nullify California Supreme Court decisions that unnecessarily expanded the rights
of accused criminals).
17. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION, June 5, 1990, at
32-35. [hereinafter BALLOT PAMPHLET].
18. See id. at 34. "Ballot summaries and arguments are accepted sources from
which to ascertain the voters' intent and understanding of initiative measures." In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 888 n.8, 694 P.2d 744, 753 n.8, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 640 n.8
(1985).
19. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 17, at 34.
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trated by delay, plea bargaining runs rampant." 20 The argument
continued that Proposition 115 had "the support of thousands of
innocent victims of crime who have been the objects of violence,
or have lost loved ones, and been dragged through the courts for
years by the delaying tactics of highly paid lawyers and an unfeel-
ing legal bureaucracy.",
2'
Proposition 115 was crafted in response to the frustration and
dissatisfaction that is also reflected in the proposition's preamble.
Section 1(a) of Proposition 115 recites that "[w]e the people of the
State of California hereby find that the rights of crime victims are
too often ignored by our courts and by our State Legislature."
22
Section 4 of the initiative-codified in Article I of the California
Constitution-provides that "[i]n a criminal case, the People of the
State of California have the right to due process of law and to a
speedy and public trial." 3 Finally, section 5 of the initiative, also
added to Article I of the California Constitution, states that "[i]n
order to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases, hearsay
evidence shall be admissible at preliminary hearings, as prescribed
by the Legislature or by the people through the initiative proc-
ess."
24
With this background in mind, it is clear that the purpose of
permitting hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings is to protect
victims and witnesses. Sections 1(a) and (c) and section 5 reiterate
that the stated concern of the initiative is the safety and protection
of crime victims, witnesses, and their rights.2' One obvious protec-
tion that hearsay preliminary hearings afford crime victims and
witnesses is that they do not have to testify at both the preliminary
hearing and again at trial.2 It also forecloses numerous trips to the
courthouse in anticipation of hearings often postponed. It protects
child victims from the inherent embarrassment of repeating hor-
rors they have suffered. Thus, section 872(b) was drafted with the
intent to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases. This in-
tent mandates that the term "declarant," as used in this section,
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 1990 Cal. Stat. A-243, § 1(a).
23. Id. § 4 (codified at CAL. CONS'r. art. I, § 29).
24. Id. § 5 (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30).
25. See id §§ 1(a), (c), 5.
26. See Whitman v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1088, 820 P.2d 262, 277, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 175 (1991) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); Martin v. Su-
perior Court, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1198-99, 281 Cal. Rptr. 682, 686 (1991).
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should not be interpreted to include the exculpatory hearsay
statements of a criminal defendant.
Nevertheless, Nienhouse completely overlooks this historical
landscape of Proposition 115 and provides an expansive definition
of "declarant." 27 Basically, the court's argument has three parts:
(1) the terms of the statute do not prevent including a de-
fendant within the meaning of the term "declarant";
(2) this conclusion is consistent with the expansive use of
declarant adopted by the supreme court in Whitman v.
Superior Cour? and,
(3) any other conclusion would be unfair and lack balance
in the criminal process under a due process argument.29
The first argument fails because it ignores the basic rule of
statutory interpretation that a statute must be construed in light of
the legislative purpose and design." The second argument is un-
persuasive since the California Supreme Court in Whitman did not
discuss this issue and, thus, is not authority for the court's conclu-
sion in Nienhouse.31 Finally, the third argument conflicts with the
express finding of the California Supreme Court in Whitman that
the statute is not fundamentally unfair in providing a limited ex-
ception to the general hearsay exclusionary rule.32
Thus, the holding in Nienhouse violates one of the basic tenets
of statutory construction: A statute should not be interpreted to
frustrate the change intended by an amendment but rather to as-
certain and effectuate legislative intent.33 Interpreting "declarant"
to include a defendant ignores the intent and goal of Proposition
115 and violates the canons of statutory construction.
A. Evidence Code Section 1220 and Other Conflicts
Penal Code section 872(b) begins with the phrase,
"Notwithstanding section 1200 of the Evidence Code" before set-
ting forth its provision. Evidence Code section 1200 defines hear-
27. See Nienhouse v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 83, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573
(1996).
28. 54 Cal. 3d 1063,820 P.2d 262,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (1991).
29. See Nienhouse, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 89-92,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576-78.
30. See People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1007, 741 P.2d 154, 156, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 656, 658 (1987).
31. See People v. Superior Court (Marks), 1 Cal. 4th 56, 65-66, 820 P.2d 613, 617,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389,392-93 (1991).
32. See Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1082,820 P.2d at 273,2 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
33. See Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d at 1007,741 P.2d at 156,239 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
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say "as a statement that was made other than by a witness while
testifyih and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated." According to the language of 872(b), (1) a law enforce-
ment officer is allowed to testify to an out-of-court statement, (2)
the statement may be offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
and (3) a magistrate may base a finding of probable cause, either
wholly or partially, on such statements.35  The word
"notwithstanding" means "despite" or "in spite of."36 As used in
this statute, "notwithstanding section 1200 of the Evidence Code"
means that the following provision exists as law, even though by its
own terms it would normally be inadmissible hearsay. Clearly,
then, section 872(b) adds a new exception to the hearsay rule.
However, the rest of the statute does not refer to or address
any other provisions of the Evidence Code. Given that the impact
of section 872(b) on the hearsay rule was considered by the draft-
ers of Proposition 115, as evidenced by the explicit reference to
section 1200, and the fact that no other part of the hearsay rule and
its exceptions were mentioned, the conclusion is inescapable that
all other parts of the hearsay rule and its exceptions remain in ef-
fect. This conclusion is consistent with the statutory rule of con-
struction that the failure to change the law in a particular respect
when the subject is considered, and changes in other respects are
made, is an indication of an intent to leave the law as it stands in
the aspects not amended.37 Without doubt, no other provision of
the hearsay rule was changed by the enactment of subdivision (b)
and the hearsay rule remains in full force and effect. However, the
holding in Nienhouse creates a tension with other exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
Evidence Code section 1220 permits the admission into evi-
dence of a hearsay statement made by a party to an action when
offered against the party.8 In other words, in a criminal case the
prosecutor may introduce into evidence hearsay statements made
34. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1995).
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West Supp. 1996).
36. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICrIONARY 928 (3d ed. 1988).
37. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 129, 763 P.2d 852, 862, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 11 (1988).
38. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220. "Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a
party in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether the
statement was made in his individual or representative capacity." Id.
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by a defendant.39 This provision, however, has consistently been
interpreted to preclude the admission of a defendant's self-serving
hearsay statements into evidence.
For example, in People v. Edwards4 the California Supreme
Court rejected the claim that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit into evidence defendant's notebook proffered by the de-
fense.4' The court held that "[a] defendant in a criminal case may
not introduce hearsay evidence for the purpose of testifying while
avoiding cross-examination." 42 The court explained that the rea-
son for this rule centers on the lack of reliability, the factor that is
essential for a hearsay exception. When the defendant wrote those
statements in the notebook after the crime had been committed,
"[h]e had a compelling motive to deceive and seek to exonerate
himself from, or at least to minimize his responsibility for, the
shootings. There was 'ample ground to suspect defendant's mo-
tives and sincerity' when he made the statements." 43
This raises another issue. If the statement offered is a hearsay
statement of a mental or physical condition, then the statement
must comply with Evidence Code section 1252. That section pro-
vides that "a statement is inadmissible ... if the statement was
made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustwor-
thiness." 44 Given the concerns for reliability and trustworthiness
noted by the cited supreme court opinions and that cross-
examination of those statements is not available since the People
cannot call the defendant as a witness, it would seem unlikely that
this threshold requirement will ever be met.
Nevertheless, pursuant to the Nienhouse holding, a defen-
dant's self-servinF exculpatory statements are admissible at a pre-
liminary hearing. What is very troubling is that the court failed to
address the fact that its holding conflicts with long-standing Cali-
fornia Supreme Court precedent, which has been consistently fol-
39. See id.
40. 54 Cal. 3d 787,819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991).
41. See id. at 819-20,819 P.2d at 456, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
42. Id. (citing People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 69, 679 P.2d 433, 453, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 782, 802 (1984) (holding that defendant's poems were properly excluded be-
cause they were "offered as a means of testifying without submitting to cross exami-
nation.")).
43. Id. at 820, 819 P.2d at 456, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716 (citing People v. Whitt, 51
Cal. 3d 620, 643, 798 P.2d 849, 862, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 265 (1990)).
44. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1252.
45. See Nienhouse, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 86,46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574-75.
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lowed. The court also failed to explain how to reconcile this result
with the manifest intent of Proposition 115 not to expand the
rights of accused criminals.4
B. The Erosive Effect of Proposition 115
Among the canons of statutory construction is the rule that
"language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if do-
ing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature
did not intend" 47 and should not be interpreted to frustrate that in-
tent.4 However, the Nienhouse holding grants criminal defendants
a new right that did not exist prior to the passage of the initiative,
thereby expanding the rights of criminal defendants. Interpreting
Proposition 115 to lead to this result violates the above cited rules
of statutory construction as well as case precedent.
Another problem with the Nienhouse holding is the court's
due process argument that "[a]ny other conclusion would work an
unfairness and a lack of balance in the criminal process. 49 How-
ever, the California Supreme Court in Whitman v. Superior Court?0
came to the contrary conclusion. Central to the due process issue
was whether section 872(b) was a broad grant of authority given to
benefit one side and denied the other and, thus, was a violation of
that federal constitutional right.51 The court found, however, that
the limited hearsay exception granted to the Peogle in section
872(b) did not qualify as a broad grant of authority. Rather, this
hearsay exception was characterized by the court as a limited ex-
ception of a specialized nature. In conclusion, the Whitman court
found that "in light of the specialized nature of the exception, we
see nothing fundamentally unfair in failing to provide some similar
hearsay exception favoring the defense."3 Given this language, it is
patently clear the court found that lack of reciprocity to the de-
fense was not a denial of due process. Thus, the argument in
46. See BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 17, at 32.
47. Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 673, 423 P.2d 193, 198, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265,
270 (1967).
48. See People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 273, 497 P.2d 481, 499, 102 Cal. Rptr.
137, 155 (1972).
49. Nienhouse, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 92,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578.
50. 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1082, 820 P.2d 262,273, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 171 (1991).
51. See id; see also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973) (holding that
a broad grant of authority given to one side, but not the other, would be a due proc-
ess violation).
52. See Whitman, 54 Cal. 3d at 1082, 820 P.2d at 273,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
53. l (emphasis added).
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Nienhouse lacks the support it claims.
Nienhouse also refers to the California Supreme Court's par-
enthetical notation in Whitman that left open the question whether
"the defendant [may] call a law enforcement officer to relate
statements which might rebut a finding of probable cause" as sup-
port for its holding. This "question" is used by Nienhouse to ar-
gue that the California Supreme Court must have meant what
Nienhouse concludes, that the section 872(b) hearsay exception
applies to a defendant's statement.f Clearly, the conclusion that
the defense may, introduce a defendant's exculpatory hearsay
statements through the testimony of a law enforcement officer is
very different from the question of whether the defense may intro-
duce defense evidence through the testimony of a law enforcement
officer. The latter is the question left unanswered in Whitman, the
former is the Nienhouse holding. Under closer scrutiny, the un-
derpinnings of the Nienhouse court's due process argument con-
tinue to evaporate.
The Nienhouse court also argues that any other conclusion
leads to unfairness and lack of balance in the criminal justice sys-
tem.5 Under existing law the defendant may put on a defense,57
cross-examine the People's witnesses, 8 and even call the hearsay
declarant to testify notwithstanding Evidence Code section
1203.1. 5' Yet the People may not call defendants to testify in vio-
lation of their Fifth Amendment right not to testify or to incrimi-
nate themselves.0 Therefore, the People are precluded from cross-
examining defendants as to their self-serving statements. Yet, the
need for cross-examination is especially strong in this situation
and, in fact, is compelling.61 Contrary to the court's argument in
54. Id
55. See Nienhouse, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 90,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577.
56. Id. at 92,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578.
57. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
58. See People v. Erwin, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1542, 1550, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 352
(1993).
59. See id. (holding that Evidence Code section 1203.1 does not preclude the de-
fense from calling as a witness the declarant of the hearsay statements offered into
evidence by the law enforcement officer's testimony).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Presumably, the court in Nienhouse did not mean to
imply that by virtue of the admission into evidence of a defendant's hearsay state-
ment, the defendant has impliedly waived the Fifth Amendment right. That issue is
not addressed in the court's opinion.
61. People v. Livaditis, 2 Cal. 4th 759, 779, 831 P.2d 297, 309, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72,
84 (1992) (citing People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 820, 819 P.2d 436, 456, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 696,716 (1991)).
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Nienhouse, its conclusion results in an unbalanced, unfair system
allowing the admission of untested testimony.
Needless to say, this conclusion violates the specific intent of
Proposition 115 since it denies the People the right to due process
granted under section 30(b) of Article I of the California Consti-
tution. The Nienhouse court's holding contravenes the rules of
statutory construction.
It may be that an advocate of the Nienhouse position would
argue that its conclusion is mandated since another rule of statu-
tory construction requires that when a penal statute is reasonably
susceptible of two conclusions, the one more favorable to the de-
fendant should be adopted.6 2 However, the caveat to that rule is
that it does not apply if the results are contrary to legislative intent
or creates absurdities.6' As shown above, the Nienhouse interpre-
tation of Penal Code section 872(b) is contrary to the intent of the
initiative and leads to absurd results.
III. CONCLUSION
Granting the admission of a defendant's exculpatory state-
ments under section 872(b) is a significant erosion of the constitu-
tional rights granted by Proposition 115. The court's holding in
Nienhouse provides defendants with a new statutory right, de-
prives the People of due process at preliminary hearings, conflicts
with recent holdings of the California Supreme Court and Evi-
dence Code provisions, and violates several canons of statutory
construction. Unfortunately, the court's opinion fails to address
most of these issues, and for this reason as well, provides a most
unacceptable conclusion.
62. See People v. Simon, 9 Cal. 4th 493,517,886 P.2d 1271, 1287, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
278,293 (1995).
63. See People v. Davis, 166 Cal. App. 3d 760, 766, 212 Cal. Rptr. 673,677 (1985)
(citing People v. Davis, 29 Cal. 3d 814, 828-29, 633 P.2d 186, 193, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521,
528 (1981)).
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